Right To Die :: essays research papers fc

In John A. Robertsons essay, "Cruzan No Rights Violated," he argues that the decision made by the Missouri Supreme Court to sweep Nancy Beth Cruzans parents request to have their daughters artificial nutrition and hydration tube removed was non a violation of Nancy Beth Cruzans right to refuse treatment because she had not personally refused treatment. Robertson also claims that keeping Cruzan alive with this incident medical checkup treatment does not alienate her constitutional rights, or her parents. Robertson states that, " A permanently vegetative patient role does not have interests that can be harmed," just because he/she cannot tone of voice pain and doesnt know his/her present condition. Robertson then goes on to say that simply assuming that one would decline treatment in that situation because of his/her precedent beliefs is not enough evidence to maintain that the directive was, in fact, released by the said person, and to relieve their self from a state law that orders much(prenominal) a treatment, the person must have released a directive against that particular proposition treatment. If one were to argue that an unskilled patient has the right to have their medical treatment decided by another person on the condition that it follows with the patients previous beliefs, Robertson would declare that the patient is much different than they were before and does not reserve a constitutional right to be managed in the akin way they would have been. In placing the right to decide Nancys treatment in her parents hands, her parents would be acting in their own interests according to Robertson, and in choosing to check-out procedure medical treatment of their daughter, they would be denying their child medical care deemed essential by the state, which is illegal. With this in mind, Robertson says that the Supreme Court should not extend a familys privacy to include the refusal of necessary treatment when the above treatment is n ot do harm to the child. Next Robertson says that if a person wants to refuse treatment spell incompetent, it is their obligation to make a directive before becoming incompetent in order to refuse treatment on the principle of that particular directive, and that requiring this is "not an undue burden on persons who wish to issue directives against medical care when incompetent." If "clear evidence" does not exist in a past directive, Robertson says that providing the treatment does not alienate a persons right to influence his/her own care because of the lack of evidence.